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28 J . Hopkins maius omnibus quae sunt: « that which is greater than all other exiSting beings ». 7 He therefore reproaches Gaunilo for distorting his description of God. To be sure, Gaunilo does once use the expression maior natura omnium quae sunt in Section 7 (S I, 129:8-9). But there he is not confusing it with Anselm's formula. He is merely objecting to Anselm's inference from the a priori description of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought (or, in Gaunilo's formulation, the being which is greater than all others [ that can be thought]) to the conclusion that God is actually the greatest of all beings. Only if Proslogion 2 had presented - as Gaunilo deems it not to have done - a sound argument for the conclusion that God exists, and therefore is actually the greatest being, would Anselm have had a legitimate basis for contending in Proslogion 3 that God exists so really that He is not able to be thought not to exist. In contesting the soundness of Anselm's proof, Gaunilo calls for a new argument to demonstrate the real existence of something which is greater than all others (that can be thought) and which thus is greater than all other existing natures (i.e., beings). If Gaunilo's maius omnibus is really a shorthand for illud maius omnibus quae cogitari possunt - as I think it is - then he does not distort Anselm's formula by abridging it. Gaunilo's failure is rather a failure to comprehend how, within Anselm's reductio ad impossibile argument, the contradiction is arrived at. He does not understand the fonction of the contradiction nor the exact statement of the contradiction. Indeed, had he discerned exactly where the contradiction resided and what role it played within the structure of the Anselmian proof, he would not have used the abbreviation maius omnibus lest it should diminish the appearance of contradiction! Gaunilo's misapprehension is obvious when we compare Anselm's Proslogion 2 premise « If N 8 were only in the understanding, N could be thought to exist also in reality-which is greater [ than existing only in the understanding] » 9 with Gaunilo's recapitulation: « Now, if this thing existed solely in the understanding, then whatever 7 Reply to Gaunilo 5 (S I, 135: 8-10). 8 N = something than which no greater can be thought that than which a greater cannot be thought = a necessary being. 9 See p. 58 f. below for an interpretation of this premise.