BASA

Anselm's debate with Gaunilo 29 existed also in reality would be greater than it ». 10 Obviously, the recapitulation does not capture Anselm's point. For Anselm is not arguing that if N existed merely in the understanding, then a really existing stone, say, would be greater than N. Rather he is reasoning that if N existed merely in the understanding, then N could be thought to exist in reality; and since for N to exist both in the understanding and in reality would be greater than for N to exist merely in the understanding, N could be thought to be greater than it is. The next step of Gaunilo's recapitulation continues the misapprehension: « Thus », he writes, « that which is greater than all others would be less than some other and would not be greater than all others-surely a contradiction». Yet, in Proslogion 2 An– selm's next move had generated a contradiction without comparing N with any other actual or conceivable being: « Thus, if N existed only in the understanding, then N would be not-N ». Gaunilo's failure to grasp the reductio technique was not the result but the cause of his simplifying the longer expression to maius omnibus. For, given this failure, nothing except prolixity would be gained by his having written: « Thus, that which is greater than all others that can be thought would be less than some other and would not be greater than all others that can be thought-sureiy a contradiction ». For he had already missed the point in formulating his previous premise, where the misconception would also not have 10 Gaunilo's recapitulation occurs in On Behalf of the Foot 1: « To one who doubts whether there exists or denies that there exists a nature than which nothing greater can be thought, the daim is made that the existence of this nature is proven from two considerations: firs t, from the fact that the very one who doubts or denies the existence of this nature already has tbis nature in his understanding when, upon hearing it spoken of, he understands what is said; and, secondly, from the fact that, necessarily, what he understands exists not only in his understanding but also in reality. This second consideration is [allegedly] established by the following reasoning: To exist also in reality is greater than to exist solely in the understanding. Now, if this thing exi~ted solely in the understanding, then whatever existed also in reality would be greater than it. Thus, that which is greater than all others would be less than some other and would not be greater than all others - surely a contradiction. Therefore, it is necessary that that which is greater than ail others (having already been shown to exist in the understanding) exists not only in the understanding but also in reality. For otherwise it could not be that which is greater than all others (S 1, 125:3-13 ).