BASA

36 J. Hopkins one of its premises is not analogons to the premise in Proslogion 2, 23 he goes on to show, as in Proslogion 3, that N exists so really that it cannot be thought not to exist. So although severing these passages may not be wrong, it is, to be sure, not obviously helpful. Furthermore, what legitimate reason could there be for putting S I, 132: 10-21 immediately before 132 :3-9, as Hick and McGill do on p. 13, thus reversing Anselm's order? This reversai would be acceptable only if thereby some clarity were gained-as it is not. Also, SI, 131:6-11 is no more a reply to Gaunilo's 129:1-10 than to his 127:25-128:13. Worst of all, Hick and McGill fragment and restructure not only Anselm's Reply, which they deem but a series of notes; but they also do the same thing with Gaunilo's On Behalf of the Fool, even though they do not regard it as a collection of notes! Their procedure is utterly uncalled for; indeed, it even miscasts the entire debate with Anselm. For instance, they place next to last what Gaunilo placed first (viz., S I, 125:6-13). Thus, Gaunilo's initial misstatement and misapprehension of the logic of Anselm's argument-a misstatement which governs the rest of his short treatise-is lost sight of at the outset. This misstatement was so serions that it provoked Anselm's strong response at the beginning of his Reply. In fact, Anselm's three attempts in Section I (S I, 131: 1-17) to reformulate the statement of his argument corne in direct response to Gaunilo's misstatement in his, Gaunilo's, Section 1. Yet, 23 Gaunilo discusses a thing (viz., an island) than which no greater island can be thought-whereas Anselm discusses a thing than which nothing greater can be thought. To effect a legitimate counterargument, believes Anselm (perhaps wrongly), Gaunilo would have to talk about an island than which nothing greater can be thought. But no contradiction results from denying that such a thing exists - whereas a contradiction does result from denying that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists (given the presupposition that existence is a perfection). When Gaunilo discusses an island than which no greater island can be thought, he seems to accept Anselm's construal of « greater » as « better ». Thus, he mentions that the island « abounds with countless riches and delights of all sorts ». He shows no sign either of restricting « greater » to size (e.g., an island 1,000 miles in circumference is greater than one 200 miles in circumference) nor of supposing that the island with its delights would be better (i.e., greater) in proportion to its size. For Gaunilo the daim « The bigger the island the better » would be as counterintuitive as for us is the assertion « The bigger the flower the better ». So no one is entitled to object to the logic of Gaunilo's counterexample on the ground tbat, like « the positive integer than which no greater positive integer can be conceived », the notion « the island than which no greater island can be conceived » is unintelligible.