BASA

42 J. Hopkins For his part, Gaunilo is more explicit about thinking secundum rem veram and secundum vocem. 37 Although I can think of a non-existent man by reference to a real thing known to me, I cannot at all think of God except only with respect to the word. And with respect only to a word a real thing can scarcely, if at all, be thought of. For when one thinks with respect to a mere word, he thinks not so much the word itself (i.e., not so much the sound of the letters or syllables), which assuredly is a real thing, as he does the signification of the word that is heard. Yet, [the signification is] not [ thought] in the manner of one who knows what is usually meant by the word-i.e., one who thinks in accordance with the thing, whether it is real or exists in thought alone. Rather, [the signification is thought] in the manner of one who does not know what is usually signified by the word but who (1) thinks only according to the movement of the mind brought about by hearing this word and who (2) has difficulty in representing to himself the signification of what he has heard. (But it would be surprising if he could ever [in this manner discern] what the thing is). So then, it is still evident that this is the only way something is in my understanding when I hear and understand someone who says that there is something greater than all others that can be thought. (S I , 127:10-23) . So Gaunilo, speaking for the Pool, supposes that what God is cannot be thought. And Anselm takes the trouble in Reply 8 to show him how God's nature can be thought without taking the trouble in Reply 4 to clarify how God's non-existence can be thought . Here we must notice two additional points . First, in Reply 8 Anselm's method of « analogically » conceiving God's nature is altogether different from the via negativa of John Scotus Eriugena and Pseudo-Dionysius, who were willing to say only that God is more than goodness and the cause of goodness . 38 Secondly, what Anselm means by his statement that the Proslogion develops unum argumentum 39 is that it proceeds to unfold a single line of reasonin[!.– not that there is only one major argument, or argument-form. Of course, for him the major argument for God's existence is that of Proslogion 2. 40 He regards Proslogion 3 not as introducing a further 37 These terms occur in Section 4 (e.g., S I , 127: 12-13). 38 De Divisione Naturae (Patrologia Latina 122:459D, 463D, 464A). 39 See Anselm's preface to the Proslogion. In the strictest sense, « argumentum » means « premise ». Note Anselm's use of « pro argumentis » = « as premises » in S II, 177: 16 (De Processione, Ch. I). •o Note my Section 7. In Proslogion 2 Anselm assumes that God is identical