BASA

44 J. Hopkins 5. Three arguments /rom Reply 1. Let us now look closely 43 at the three arguments in S I, 131: 1-17 . 5.1. The first of these, SI, 131:1-5, is formulable as: (1) For any object x, if x can be thought to exist and yet x does not exist, then x can be thought to begin to exist (premise) . Hence, (2) if N can be thought to exist and yet N does not exist, then N can be thought to begin to exist - instance of (1). But (3) it is not the case that N can be thought to begin to exist. (a) What exists without beginning is greater than what exists through a beginning (presupposition). Assume: (b) N can be thought to begin to exist. Then, (c) N can be thought to be greater than it is (impossible). Thus, (d) it is not the case that N can be thought to begin to exist . So, (4) it is not the case that N can be thought to exist and yet not exist (2) (3). Thus, (5) if N can be thought to exist, it must be the case that N does exist (4). It is important to recognize that in the last step Si ergo cogitari potest esse, ex necessitate est is to be read as « Therefore, if it [N] can be thought to exist, it is necessary that it exists » instead of as « Therefore, if it [N] can be thought to exist, it exists necessarily ». 43 [l.] « With confidence I assert that if N can be even thought to exist, it is necessary that it exists. For N can only be thought to exist without a beginning. Now, whatever can be thought to exist but does not exist can be thought to begin to exist. Thus, it is not the case that N can be thought to exist and yet does not exist. Therefore, if it can be thought to exist, it is necessary that it exists. [2.] « Furthermore, if indeed it can be even thought, it is necessary that it exists. For even one who doubts or denies the existence of N adroits that if this being were to exist it would neither actually nor conceivably be able not to exist. For otherwise [i.e., if it existed but were able not to exist] it would not be N. Now, as for whatever can be thought but does not exist: if it were to exist, it would either actually or conceivably be able not to exist. Therefore, if N can be even thought, N is not able not to exist. [3.] « But let us suppose that it can be thought and yet does not exist. Now, whatever can be thought and yet does not exist would not, if it were to exist, be N. Hence, if N [assumed for the sake of argument not to exist] were to exist, it would not be N-an utterly absurd consequence. Therefore, it is false [to suppose] that N can be thought and yet does not exist ».