BASA

Anselm's debate with Gaunilo 45 That is, the necessity applies to the inference not to the quality of existence (cf. S I, 135:30-31); hence, Anselm might equally have expressed the consequent as « Then, it must follow that N exists ». 44 Now, this sentence, so construed and taken together with the one immedi-ately preceding it, suggests that Anselm made use of the rule -(p.-q)=(p=:>q), although he nowhere states this rule explicitly, and although what he actually says warrants only -(p.-q)=>(p=:>q). 5.2. The next section in the Schmitt text (SI, 131:6-11) must be viewed, I think, as containing two interlinking arguments, some of whose premises are suppressed. As the argument is presented it is not in good logical form. For it is not clear how the stated premises could warrant the conclusion that N is not able not to exist. Yet, Anselm has told the reader enough to allow him to supply the missing premises and to combine them with the stated premises so that jointly they do entai! the desired conclusion. This can be accomplished in two parts. " Anselm never mentions the possibility of a counterargument in support of the Fool: (1) Either N is able to begin to exist or N is not able to begin to exist (premisc). Assume: (2 ) N is able to begin to exist. So, Hence, Hence, (a) What is able to begin to exist can be thought to begin to exist (premise). (b) What exists without beginning is greater than what exists through a beginning (presupposition). (c) N can be thought to be greater than it is (impossible). (3) it is not the case that N is able to begin to exist (2) (b). (4) N is not able to begin to exist (1) (3 ). (5) If anything does not exist but it is able to exist, then it is able to begin to exist (premise). Hence, (6) if N does not exist but N is able to exist, then N is able Thus, Thus, Assume: Then, So, to begin to exist (instance of (5)). (7) it is not the case that N does not exist and N is able to exist (4) (6). (8) either N exists or N is not able to exist (7 ). (9) N does not exist. (10) N is not able to exist (8) (9). (11) if N does not exist, N is not able to exist (9) (10). N.B. N can, nonetheless, be thought to exist (because whatever can be thought can be thought to exist); i.e., « N exists » is not self– contradictory. N.B. « N does not exist and N is able to exist » is inconsistent.