BASA

Anselm's debate with Gaunilo 47 have been helpful had Schmitt placed a new paragraph at this point in the Latin text): Thus, Assume : Then, Bence, So, (1) If anything can be thought and does not exist, then if it were to exist it would not be N (because it would be able not to exist. Cf. Argument 2, steps A, 1 and A, 3) (premise). (2) if N can be thought and N does not exist, then if it were to exist it would not be N (instance of (1) ). (3) N can be thought and N does not exist. (4) if N were to exist N would not be N-an impossible hypothetical (2) (3 ). (5) it is not the case that N can be thought and N does not exist (3) ( 4). (6) if N can be thought, N exists (5). As just presented, these premises have a slightly different order from their order in the text; 45 yet this new order reveals the movement of the argument slightly better. What is stated above as the third premise is really Anselm's opening sentence, which says literally: «Let us suppose that it [N] does not exist if it can be even thought ». Now, it would be wrong to construe the logical form of this proposition as p~-q. For the very next sentence (follow– ing the order of the text) states: « Whatever can be thought and yet does not exist would not, if it were to exist, be that than which a greater cannot be thought ». Without doubt, Anselm regards the proposition expressed by the opening sentence as a substitution instance of the proposition expressed by the second sentence. To make this clear to the reader, one is obliged to translate Anselm's meaning rather than his exact words. And the meaning of his opening sentence is p.-q: «Let us suppose that N can be thought and yet does not exist ». 6. Cogitare and cogitare esse. In looking back on Argument 1 and Argument 2, we notice a shift from « If N can be thought to exist » to « if N can be even thought ». 46 What is the significance of this switch? Is Anselm making some important epistemological or logical point? I do not think so. Let it be acknowledged that he accepted a distinction between (1) thinking of something (i.e., " The same is true of the text of Arguments 1 and 2 and my representations of them.