BASA

50 J. Hopkins existed in reality as well as existing in the understanding. So what Anselm means by (5) can be restated: (S') : If N were only in the understanding, N could be thought to exist also in reality, and for N to exist in reality would be greater than for N to exist only in the understanding. Accordingly, Anselm assumes that for N existence is a perfection. But does he assume that for conceivable abjects other than N existence is also a perfection? We do not definitely know. Certainly in On Behalf of the Fool 1 Gaunilo attributes to Anselm this further assumption; and Anselm does not quarrel with the ascription. But this fact does not by itself prove (though it does warrant the presumption) that Gaunilo's construal was correct. For Anselm's argument to be valid no assumption stronger than (6,b) is required. Possibly, he might want to maintain that for something like an island existence is not a perfection (i.e., a great-making property ), though it would be a property (simpliciter). For instance, in Monologion 15 he states that being composed of gold is a property which is a perfection for a metal but not for a man (e.g., not for King Midas' daughter). So some properties may be perfections for some kinds of things but not for other kinds of things. Still, it is bard to see what basis Anselm could have for allowing that existence is a perfection in the case of N but disallowing it in the case of other conceivable abjects. For unlike the property of being composed of gold, the « property » of existing never detracts from any perfection which an abject bas. If, therefore, it is a perfection for any abject, it must be a perfection for every abject. My own sense of the matter is that Anselm recognized this implication 50 and in fact did accept the generalized premise 5 ° For a different view see D. M. LocHHEAD, Is Existence a Predicate in Anselm's Argument, in: Religious Studies, 2 (Üctober 1966), 124. Lochhead maintains that Anselm subscribed only to (6 b) and not to (P). ln Existence as a Perfection: A Reconsideration of the Ontological Argument, in : Religious Studies, 4 (Üctober 1968), 97, L. T. HowE contends that « Whatever exists in the understanding and outside the understanding is more perfect than whatever exists in the understanding alone » is false. As a counterexample he mentions secrets. But this example is not really to the point since in Proslogion 2 and Reply 1 Anselm's universe of discourse is « substances ». He is not dealing with dreams, illusions, or secrets - none of which can exist independently of the mind. I may, to be sure, wonder whether tonight I shall have such and such a recurrent dream. If I do have this dream, then (Anselm could say) the dream