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52 J . Hopkins noted before and would not be worth repeating here were it not for the recent attempt to deny them. Thus, La Croix supposes that in Proslogion 2 (S) must be unpacked as: 52 (a) If N exists only in the understanding, then N does not exist in reality. (b) If N does not exist in reality, then N can fail to exist in reality. (c) If N can fail to exist in reality, then N can be thought not to exist in reality .5 3 (d) If N can be thought not to exist in reality and N can be thought to exist in reality, then N can be thought to be greater. (e) N can be thought to exist in reality. (f) It is false that N can be thought to be greater than it is. Now, (b) - (/),La Croix daims, constitute Anselm's single argument– form (p. 124 ). But it seems to me that if there is such a form, it is better expressed as (F): For any predicate x such that it is greater to be x than not to be x, if N were not x (e.g., existent, unable to be thought not to exist, omnipotent, etc.), then N would be not-N, for N could be thought to be greater than it is; but N cannot be thought to be greater than it is; therefore, N is x.5' 52 La Croix, Chapter 3 - especially 99-100; 106-107. La Croix interprets (S) by reference to the principle of Reply 5 which states: « What does not exist is able not to exist; and what is able not to exist is able to be thought not to exist ». This principle is implicit in Reply 1. " Anselm nowhere teaches, and indeed always Jenies, that N can be thought not to exist in the sense that something can be thought not to exist because it is able not to exist (à la Reply 5); for it is never the case that N is able not to exist. He does allow that we can assume (a Pickwickian sense of « think ») N not to exist - just as in a logical proof we might assume a premise which we do not realize to be self-contradictory. We can think this schema in the sense of premising it; but we cannot think it consistently. By comparison, Anselm regards « N does not exist » as self-contradictory and therefore as unable to be thought (consistently ), though able to be assumed as a step in a proof. " (F) = (F'): (1) Let x be any predicate such that to be x is greater than not to be x. (2) Either N is x or N is not x. Assume: (3) N is not x. (a) N can be thought to be x. So, (b) N can be thought to be greater than it is (and so N is that than which a greater can be thought) (impos– sible). So, (4) N is x.