BASA

Anselm's debate with Gaunilo 53 This formula differs slightly from La Croix's. First, it recognizes explicitly that Anselm is committed to the presuppositions that (i): to exist (in reality) is, in itself, better than not to exist (in reality) and (ii): to be unable to be thought not to exist is, in itself, better than to be able to be thought not to exist and recognizes that these enter into his reasoning. Secondly, the formula does not have to be unpacked by reference to Reply 5. Thirdly, it makes room for the presence of an independently valid argument in Proslogion 2. And finally, it allows that in Reply 1 Anselm develops new argument-forms-i .e., forms which do more than simply explicate (F). In one respect, then, Malcolm and Hartshorne are right about Proslogion 2 and its relation to the Reply. For they realize that Proslogion 2 constitutes for Anselm an « independent » argument for the existence of N, or Gad, and that in Reply 1 Anselm is opening up new arguments to prove the same conclusion (though he goes on in Reply 2 to reiterate the proof contained in Proslogion 2). Conclusion. In Anselm's Discovery Hartshorne speaks dispa– ragingly of the « Gaunilo tradition », or « Gaunilo legend »- 55 meaning the tradition of « mistaken » objections leveled by Gaunilo against Anselm. Hartshorne goes so far as to quote Koyré's verdict: « Gaunilo seems to have understood the corrections which Saint Anselm addressed to him; at least, he did not reply. The modems have neglected this highly instructive polemic, and this is why we have seen them repeating since Gassendi, since Kant, and down to out own time (1923) the same objections, the same errors, as those of the monk of Marmoutiers ». 56 Perhaps Hartshorne and Koyré are wrong. Perhaps there was simply too much mutual confusion for the debate to continue profitably. Now that some of these confusions have been cleared up, we ourselves will be in a better position to evaluate Anselm's response and to decide whether any substantive objections remain for the Gaunilo tradition, or whether this tradition must succumb to the soundness of at least one reformulation of the ontological proof. 55 E.g., pp. 133, 178, 236, 286, 298. 56 Anselm's Discovery, 13. Note also p. 98.