BASA

Two «new» cr~tiques of the Ontol. Argument 57 involved in denying the antecedant. Anselm does this in the following oft quoted text: « Now certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the intellect only. For if it exists only in the intel– lect, it can be thought that it exists also in reality, which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought exists only in the intellect, that very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is something than which a greater can be thought. But cer– tainly this cannot be. Hence, beyond doubt there is something than which a greater cannot be thought both in the intellect and in reality » (Proslogion, c. 2). The modus ponendo ponens counterpart of Anselm's reasoning is given by Bonaventure in the following succinct passage from De Mysterio Trinitatis: 4 If God is God, then God is. But « God is God » is so true it cannot be conceived not to be. Hence, God exists. Both Anselm and Bonaventure daim that the logical necessity of their second premise rests upon its being an identity statement, and, surely, all identity statements are necessarily true. It is precisely here, however, where the argument seems unassailable, that the Occamist critique cuts deepest. Occam, in effect, denies that the statement « God is God » (« Deus est Deus ») is necessarily true. 5 Let us examine how Occam can say this. I have not been able to find any place where Occam directs himself specifically to Anselm's argument, although, in so far as Occam does insist, as Thomas Aquinas does, that we can have no 4 See WEINBERG, op. cit., p. 168, and De Mysterio Trinitatis, I, i, 29. 5 Occam's most complete discussion of God, His existence and nature, can be found in Book One of His Sentence Commentary, primarily the prologue. He sometimes refers to Anselm herein, e.g. Bk. I , dist. i,q. vi and Bk. I , dist. ii, q. iii; but never in connection with Anselm's argument for the existence of God. Occam does consider herein the argument of Duns Scotus, and finds reason to criticise it on several points. Many historians consider Scotus' argument to be a child of the Anselmian argument; hence, one could apply Occam's criticisms of Scotus to Anselm. But I feel that Scotus' argument is fundamentally different from Anselm's, and, hence, Occam's critique of the former is really not applicable to the latter. Occam also discusses the existence of God in his Questions on the First Book of Aristotle's Physics, questions: cxxxii, cxxxiii, cxxxiv, cxxxv, and cxxxvi; and in Quodlibet I , q.i. These latter are translated by Philotheus Bochner in 0CKHAM, Philosophical Writings. Once again, however, Occam never addresses himself directly to the argument of Anselm.