BASA

58 P. A. Streveler intuition of the essence of God, 6 and in so far as Anselm's argument requires that we have some direct intuition of the divine essence as that than which no greater can be thought, 7 the upshot of Occam's view was probably the same as that of Thomas, 8 that if any demonstration of God's existence is possible, it would have to be an a posteriori proof. At any rate, Occam's remarks concerning the identity statement « Deus est Deus » have a natural application to Anselm's argument. Question II of the Prologue of Occam's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard asks: « Whether clear knowledge of theological truths is 'science' properly so-called ». 9 After examining other opinions on the subject, making the necessary distinctions, and defining how he proposes to use the term 'science', Occam presents bis conclusions. Occam's first conclusion is that we can present no scientific demonstrations of theological truths wherein a daim to demonstrate any reality of the divine essence is made. The upshot of his position is that no proposition, in which the terms, « divine essence » or any terms equivalent to these supposit personally (i.e. for the reality of the divine essence), 10 can be known per se, and, hence, no strict scientific demonstration of these propositions 6 That Occam holds this view can be easily verified from numerous texts, especially: Sentence Commentary, Bk. 1, dist. 3, q. iv: « Utrum Deus esse sit per se et naturaliter notum ». 7 1t is less clear that Anselm actually held this view than that Occam truly denied it. Nevertheless, :is will become clear when we discuss the critique of Gregory of Rimini, if Anselm's argument is to be relevant, he must hold that we do have a notion of God in his divine essence. Anselm himself, however, is inconsistent on this point, for he does insist that we do understand God as that than which no greater can be thought; and yet that God is actually greater than the greatest conceivable being, and, hence, inconceivable. 1 do not know how to remedy this problem. On the authority of Thomas Aquinas, Anselm certainly did think that we can have a conception of God in His essence. 8 Summa Theologiae, 1, q . 13; On the Names of God, q . 2, a. i; Summa Contra Centiles, 1, 10-12. 9 « Utrum notitia evidens veritatum Theologiae sit scientia proprie dicta ». 1 am using the recent edition of this work by the Franciscan lnstitute, St. Bonaven– ture, N. Y. (1967). Question II begins on pg. 75 of Vol. 1 and goes to p. 129 of the same volume. 10 The medieval theory of suppositio is operative throughout this discussion. lt is unnecessary, 1 think, to elaborate this theory here. Very briefly, and somewhat inaccurately, the medieval distinction between «persona! or significative supposition» and « material supposition » parallels the modern distinction between the material and forma! modes of speech. A simple example of « persona! or significative supposition» is : « Socrates is a man»; and an example of « material supposition» is: « 'Man' is monosyllabic ».