BASA

Two «new-; critiques of the Onto!. Argument 59 can be given. It is not necessary for us to go into a detailed exposition of what Occam means here; the interesting passage for my purposes is the following: « Here someone could declare that whoever distinctly under– stands "divine essence" and predicates it of itself, cannot doubt concerning that proposition, but it would be known to him from the terms." And yet, this proposition which we would have : '!God is God", is capable of doubt, because it is equivalent to this: "The highest and infinite being is the highest and infinite being". For we say this, or something similar, is the nominal definition of God. And yet, this proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself, is capable of doubt, just as the combination of those things which are posited on the part of the subject is capable of doubt : so too, if the combination of these is false, the whole proposition is false, because of a false implication. Just as, if no man were white, this is false: "The white man is the white man", so too, also this: "Something is the white man" (i.e. "Something exists which is the white man") ». 12 Occam seems to be making two different but related points in the above passage: (1) Our definition of « God » or «Divine essence » includes the notions of the highest and infinite being; but we have no clear conception of the infinite. Hence, at least one part of the nominal definition of « divine essence » is, for us, inconceivable . 13 (2) When using terms significatively (or personally) it can be assumed that we intend them to refer to some reality other than the terms themselves. In any proposition in which we are speaking about some one quite distinct and definite (not to say unique) entity or individual such as the referent of « God » or 11 We would say the proposition is « analytic ». 12 «Hoc potest declarari: quia qui distincte intelligeret divinam essentiam et praedicaret eam de seipsa, non posset dubitare de illa propositione, sed esset sibi nota ex terminis. Et tamen ista propositio quam nos habemus : « Deus est Deus» est dubitabilis quia ista aequipollet isti: 'ens summum et infinitum est ens summum et infinitum'. Hoc enim dicimus esse 'quid hominis' Dei, vel aliquid consimile. Et tamen ista in qua praedicatur idem de se, est dubitabilis; sicut si unio illorum quae ponuntur a parte subjecti est dubitabilis; sicut si unio illorum esset falsa, tota propositio esset falsa, propter falsam implicationem. Sicut si nullus homo esset albus, haec esset falsa: 'homo albus est homo albus', sicut et ista, 'aliquid est homo albus' », op. cit. pp. 112-113. 13 When Occam calls the notion of « infinity » an impossible concept, or ranks it among the « impossibilia » and « non entia » (vide: Summa Logicae, Pt. Il, c. 14) be does not mean to say, I think, that it is a contradictory expression; for this would mean that one part of the nominal definition of « Deus » is contradictory, hence « Deus » itself would be contradictory. Rather, be simply means that it is inconceivable for us as wayfarers to grasp infinity.