BASA

Two «new» criitiques of the Ontol. Argument 63 the being than which no greater can be thought, and this is in his understanding, to what, Gregory asks, does the « this » refer? If it refers merely to the string of words: « That than which no greater can be thought », then Gregory admits that Anselm's daim that « this » is in the understanding is certainly true, but irrelevant for the argument. 23 If however, « this » refers not to the string of words, but to the entity described by the string of words-which is really what is required for the argument-then, Gregory says, that daim of Anselm's is not obviously true, and, indeed, may very well be false-or, at any rate, it surely needs to be proved and not just assumed. 24 One who denied that there is a God could easily deny this initial daim of Anselm that the being than which no greater can be thought is at least in the understanding. 25 For, Anselm simply assumes that it is a universal truth (indeed, perhaps, a necessary truth) that whatever someone understands is in the understanding. Now, Gregory in effect says, 26 in a trivial sense this is true, viz. that whenever someone is thinking of something, he is thinking of something; but it does not follow from this that whenever he is thinking there is an abject of thought in his understanding, except, perhaps, the string of words or symbols or images, if these are possible. But even these latter need not be present in the understanding every time we think. Gregory gives examples of his meaning. 27 Someone may be thinking of a stone, and yet the stone is obviously not in his intellect; although « stone » may be in the mind, or a mental image of the stone . Now, with the 23 « Si primo modo [i.e. if it supposits materially], et ipsum [i.e. 'id quo maius cogitari non posset'] sit propositio quaedam vocalis, concedo illud, et similiter consequens; si in ipso eodem modo supponat subjectum ejus, sed tune nihil ad propositum. Nam constat quod illa vox non est infinitae virtutis ». Ibid. 24 « Sed si in consequente subjectum supponat significative, patet quod con– sequentia nulla est; sicut et ista, haec vox 'aliquid quod non est', est; ergo aliquid quod non est, est; nam antecedens est verum et consequens implicat contradictionem si subjectum supponat significative ». Ibid. 25 « Sed si in consequente subjectum supponat secundo modo, sic dico quod negandum esset quantum ad primam partem ab eo qui teneret nihil esse tale ». Ibid. 26 «Et cum probatur quod audiens hoc: quod dico 'aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest' intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit est in intellectu; dico primo quod si inter has duas propositiones 'hoc intelligitur' et 'hoc est in intellectu' fiat differentia (sicut videtur Anselmus facere contra insipientem). Unde neganti banc consequentiam: 'intelligitur, ergo est in intellectu' nititur illam probare, haec enim falsa est; 'omne quod quis intelligit est in intellectu' ». Ibid.