BASA

64 P. A. Streveler terms 'unthinkable', or 'nothing', or 'not something' not only is there not an abject of thought, but there is not (cannot be?) an image in the mind. 28 Thus it is also, says Gregory, with the term 'that which cannot be thought'. For, although « that which cannot be thought » can ben thought, obviously, that which cannot be thought cannot be thought. 29 Similarly, Anselm's description of God as « that than which no greater can be thought », when properly under– stood, means not that God is the greatest conceivable being, but rather, he is a being who is greater than can be conceived. 30 But, clearly, says Gregory, if God is greater than that which can be conceived, then God cannot be conceived in the sense in which Anselm's initial assumption requires. Thus the Anselmian argument never gets off the ground, and, hence, cannot prove its conclusion. In conclusion we can see that the critiques of Occam and Rimini are interesting and unique in that they are directed primarily against aspects of Anselm's reasoning which are generally neglected in the more common critiques. While Occam criticises a premise of the argument which all others seem not even to question, Rimini asks logically prior questions of meaning and reference which seem to need to be answered before the argument can possess any veridical cogency. My analysis does not pretend to be an exhaustive or even scholarly exposition of all the subtleties of Occam's and Gregory's insights. A more complete exposition would involve us in the medieval doctrines of signification and supposition as well as many other very complex theories of medieval logic. My intention was merely to hint at the fact that there have been criticisms of the ontological argument which are worth study in their own right, and which are certainly as cogent as, and in some ways more interesting than, the criticisms so often repeated in books on the subject. 27 « Nam lapidem, quid intelligÎt, et tamen lapis non est in intellectu ». 28 « Unde sciendum est quod non omnis terminus potest pro eo supponere significative et personaliter quod ipsum significat: sicut patet de his terminis: 'nihil', et 'non-aliquid' ... ita etiam est de istis terminis: 'incogitabile', 'quod non potest cogitari', et multis aliis ». Ibid. 29 « Et patet instantia, quoniam etiam audiens hanc vocem: 'quod non potest cogitari', aut hanc: 'quod non potest intelligi', intelligit quod ipsa significat, sicut etiam intelligit hanc esse falsam: 'quod non potest cogitari, potest cogitari'. Et iueo quod per eam significatur intelligitur ab eo. Et tamen non sequitur: 'ergo quod non potest cogitari, cogitatur', aut: 'quod non potest intelligi, intelligitur' ». Ibid. "' See: WEINBERG, J. op. cit. p. 69 f.