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138 R. A. Herrera Anselm insists, in the Monologion, that reason exists for the purpose of judging what is good and what evil, choosing the former and condemning the latter. It would be altogether superfluous unless the good was loved and evil condemned. 16 Reason is then, primarily displayed in judging the level of goodness that a thing possesses, and, in accordance with this level of goodness, to love it to a greater or lesser degree. God gives 'nothing' a rational soul, so that it may become a loving soul, and the end of love is the enjoyment of God. 17 Everything that constitutes man, rationality included, is directed to this goal. I t is not mere coïncidence that the Proslogion ends with a meditation on the joy of the blessed. The Pool, then, is faced by two obstacles, only one of which he can surmount. First of all, in his denial of the existence of God he has proceeded unrigorously. It can be demonstrated - at least in Anselm's opinion - that his opinion is untenable, that his denial flaunts the law of contradiction, in brief, that he is wrong. There is no difficulty in rejecting a previously held opinion and accepting another that appears to be more solidly grounded. But, even were the Pool to do so, he would have a correct but truncated knowledge about God which is not really 'therapeutic'. The seed of meaning would be present but it is a seed that only God can germinate. If He should, then and only then, is the intellectus which proceeds from fides activated, an understanding which is a mean between faith and vision. 18 But neither Anselm nor ourselves nor even the Pool can presume on the grace of God. 16 « Denique rationali naturae non est aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere iustam a non iusto, verum a non veto, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono. Hoc autem posse omnino inutile illi est et supervacuum, nisi quod discernit amet aut reprobet secundum verae discretionis iudicium. Hinc itaque satis patenter videtur omne rationale ad hoc existere ut sicut ratione discretionis aliquid magis vel minus bonum sive non bonum iudicat, ita magis vel minus id amet aut respuat. Nihil igitur apertius quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum bonum, immo ut nihil amet nisi illam aut propter illam, quia illa est bona per se et nihil aliud est bonum nisi per illam ». Monologion, LXVIII; 78, 21 - 79, 5. 17 « Si nihilo dedit rationalem essentiam ut amans esset: quid debit amanti si amare non cesset? ..... Nam si rationalis creatura, quae sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore, sic eminet in omnibus creaturis: utique nihil potest esse praemium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis..... Quid ergo summa bonitas retribuet amanti et desideranti se, nisi seipsam? ». Ibid., LXX; 80, 15-25. 16 Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio, 40, 10-12.